THE VALUE OF HISTORY
Only the study of military history is capable of giving those who have no experience of their own a clear picture of what I have just called the friction of the whole machine. ' Karl von Clausewitz, Principles of War. 1812
The following discussion offers a reconnaissance and analysis of the past current, and prospective uses of history by military strategic leaders. Perhaps, no profession values history more than the American armed forces. It is emphasized in personal development and the curriculum of the various service schools. A central finding of this paper is that this rich tradition is carried on absent a rigorous understanding of how and why historical analysis strengths strategic decision-making. While positive outcomes can be demonstrated through studying the actions of past leaders, the actual process of cognitive enlargement remains uncertain. Consequently, military officers either study history in a serendipitous and haphazard manner or within the rigid confines of normative classes that focus on campaign case studies, the principles of warfare, and the actions of great leaders. Better understanding of the intellectual processes that make hindsight relevant to foresight could help shape historical products that more directly meet the specific needs of current and future strategic thinkers.
The wide variety of military history precludes this paper offering overview of its kaleidoscopic forms.. The focus of the essay is to examine the status and outlook of military history in the training and education of military (mainly Army) officers.
Special emphasis will be paced on the role of history in shaping strategic leaders and decision-makers as well as methodologies for using the past to serve the future.
Military officers and historians have traditionally
proclaimed that the study of past wars, campaigns, and battles enrich the reaching of strategic, operational, and tactical decisions. The lessons of history may be cast in terms of strategic imperatives, the principles of warfare, and even the most specific tactical doctrines. All in all, there seems to be a broad consensus that properly used historical insight fuels decision-making on the battlefield as well as at higher command levels.
The value of history is universally endorsed by the military services. It is embedded in the curricula of service schools and colleges, lavishly employed to enhance unit pride and cohesion, and praised as the intellectual tonic that produces commanders possessed with nonpareil creative-and critical-thinking abilities.
However, most of the writing on the value of history in military decision-making and leadership development implies that devotion to its utility is almost an act of faith. Militaryeducators and professionals assume history is a "force multiplier," describe how it is artfully used, but rarely offer insights or postulations on why judgment and "visioning" are strengthened by analyzing the past.
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Yet a critical question remains virtually ignored. What are the psychological and ideational dynamics at work that produce these revered outcomes?
Can theories and methods be developed to shape approaches to the study of history that will strengthen decisions by filtering what "lessons" are or are not appropriate for specific situations?
MILITARY HISTORY OVER TIME
If we ignore the historical importance of our profession, the society from which it comes, and why it is worth preserving, we run the risk of the guardians not valuing what they guard. traditionally has been the principal means of extending learning beyond one's own experience to enlarge the intellectual imagination through the study of others' experiences. This is true whether one seeks insights into command in war, the management of complex organizations, the conduct of campaigns, the refinement and employment of strategic principles and operational doctrine, the special challenges of combined and joint operations, the vexing aspects of logistics and communications, the optimum use of technology, and the dynamics of unit cohesion and spirit. Embracing a host of social science disciplines, the critical and systematic study of history was pushed aside by "militaryStrategie studies" at senior schools and colleges. This curriculum impulse focused on models and prescriptive outlooks that seemingly offered the military "scientific" forecasts and analyses the era demanded. 6 Ironically, the academic approach to military history began to blossom as its relevance to the armed forces declined.
Scholars began to take a wider view of the field and redefined The list included awareness of strategic and operational situations, managing and responding to change, maintaining psychological and physical stamina, and facility with computers.
The article makes no mention of history, and even suggests in the opening paragraph that shaping the future is more important than learning from the past. The lack of connectivity between the before and the future is starkly apparent. Even though history remains suffused throughout the curricula, there remains the danger that it will decline in status, diffuse, and become irrelevant. The lessons of the 1960s and 1970s may need to be learned once again.
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES
For it is history, and history alone, which, without involving us in actual danger, will mature our judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs. According to Neustadt and May, history is not just a chronicle of past events but a way of looking back to look ahead.
They believe that "thinking in time" has a special significance for military decision-makers because the profession of arms, probably more than any other, focuses on pondering about and planning for the future. If history is to be the handmaid of imagination and prescience, there needs to be some methodology to separate the wheat from the tares. Fundamentally, the purpose of history is to recreate reality and thereby help the decision-maker ask critical questions as they address a problem. 18 History can also be employed to prevent "reinventing the wheel." The adoption of historical analysis precludes decisionmaking in a void. Having facts and analysis at hand brings out nuances that can be rescued from obscurity and applied to current and future issues. It provides a depth of understanding t'o a problem, a set of issues, or the evidence that can lead to more informed and better choices. This process is not simply avoiding mistakes, but working through the gauzy complexity of facts and issues. Circumscribing history to lessons learned is inane and The military history of the United States has exhibited at times stressful tension between the armed forces desire for relevant history and the interests of college professors exhibiting specific research agendas. In addition, the armed forces employ historians that prepare "official" books and articles ranging from annual administrative summaries of specific commands to major books on aspects of prior conflicts. This merging of Clio and Mars has produced contrasting but nevertheless enriching products. It is offered up in a host of forms, including scholarly books, historical fiction, song, epic poetry, and oral traditions.
PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS
Nothing so comforts the military mind as the maxim of a great but dead general. 19 Barbara W. Tuchman The Guns of August. 1962 History has an especial value to the development of strategic At the tactical level, history offers fairly discrete and precise lessons learned. At the strategic and high operational levels, the study of the past should be more generally applied to develop perspective. Hindsight offers depths of understanding, sets of issues, and institutional memory that help the senior leader make more informed choices. History is after all accumulated experience that adds to the experiential frames of reference the officer or civilian brings to the job.
The very presence of historical mindedness within an organization provides the leadership with a powerful tool for analysis, making it more likely that a sound understanding of the past will be integrated into policy formulation and decisionmaking. The practice of "applied history" in organizational settings requires the presence of historians and key action officers that anticipate and understand the needs of leaders.
Mutual ongoing consultation between historians and policy-makers is necessary to insure that the historical products or information are timely, relevant, and in useable forms. To be effective, historians must abandon the normal deliberate pace of scholarly work. Often it is essential to act quickly and produce a product tailored to the strategist or policy-maker. Rather than a lengthy, fully footnoted monograph, the product may be an electronic briefing, a brutally frank point paper, or simply verbal input in the consultative staffing process. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten. Maintaining uninhibited and fresh approaches to military history doubtless pays dividends to all students of the field in the long run. However, as the military functions in a world that is becoming more volatile, complex, and ambiguous, the need for "targeted history" seems apparent. At the organizational level and in the senior colleges the shaping of strategic "military minds" through history will hopefully survive the current "visioning" fashion and attention to technology that seem to preoccupy the current generation of officers.
CONCLUSIONS
Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick.
Make them your models.... With your own genius enlightened by this study, you will reject all maxims opposed to those of these great commanders. 
